In order to understand international economic regulations, it is essential to understand the variation in competing corporations' interests. This book's theoretical findings open a 'black box' in the literature on international political economy and elucidate a source of regulatory differences and similarities. Its counter-intuitive case studies reveal how business and governments actually interact. By exploring powerful corporations' investment profiles and regulatory strategies, this book explains why globalization sometimes results in a 'race to the bottom', sometimes in higher common regulations, and sometimes in regulations that differ between countries. Uniquely, it then explains which regulatory outcome is likely to occur under specified conditions. The explanation incorporates economics, political science, studies of regulatory capture, and examinations of transaction costs, firms' regulatory strategies, and the roles international institutions. INDICE PART I: INTRODUCTION 1 The Puzzle, An Explanation, and Theoretical Foundations PART II: LOWER COMMON DENOMINATOR 2 Shipping Flags-of-Convenience 3 Offshore Finance PART III: HIGHER COMMON DENOMINATOR 4 Montreal Protocol on Chlorofluorocarbons 5 Basle Accord on Capital Adequacy PART IV: HETEROGENEITY 6 Mexican Tuna-Dolphin 7 U.S. Infant Formula Marketing PART V: CONCLUSION 8 Evidence from the Case Studies, and Implications Bibliography