Combining the public choice literature on political decision making with the Neo-Schumpeterian literature on innovation, this valuable new book develops a conceptual model of how environmental regulation is designed. The author presents a novel perspective on the Porter Hypothesis, arguing that the effect of environmental regulation is too weak to induce technological change. This implies that environmental policy intervention has little, if any, economic consequences which has significant repercussions for environmental decision-making. Contents: 1. Introduction 2. The Porter Hypothesis: Environmental Regulation, Innovation and Competitiveness 3. The Technological, Regulatory and Economic Environment 4. Some Stylised Facts on Technological Advance 5. Determinants and Adoption of Cleaner Technological Innovations 6. The Design of an Environmental Regulation in a Market Framework: A Conceptual Model 7. Empirical Evidence on the Genesis of Austrian VOC Emission Standards 8. Confronting the Expected Regulatory Outcome with Reality 9. Summary and Policy Implications References Index