Through a variety of analytical lenses, this text helps fill a gap in the political economy of second-wave, or microeconomic, reforms around the world, and more specifically in the context of the electricity supply industry, where such reforms have been as problematic as they have been widespread. INDICE Introduction: current models of microeconomic change methodological approach organization of the book. The model: formal models of microeconomic reform economic outcomes under different institutional arrangements the political game distributional conflict institutional choice in the absence of institutional constraints conclusions. Cross-sectional tests: testable implications dependent variable data explanatory variable data econometric tests. A comparison of four Latin American cases: the dependent variables the explanatory variables case study research design ownership outcomes competition outcomes conclusions. Explanatory factors: judicial independence ideology distributional conflict Chile conclusions on explanatory variables. Putting the pieces together - ESI restructuring in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Chile. Effects of judicial independence: Chile Argentina Brazil Bolivia. Effects of ideology: Chile Argentina Brazil Bolivia. Effects of distributional conflict: Chile Argentina Brazil Bolivia. Conclusions from the case studies. Understanding institutional change: understanding ESI reform elsewhere in Latin America prospects for reform in the Mexican ESI reforms in other sectors limitations ideas and rent-seeking in microeconomic reforms. Appendices Major variables used in the regression tests and correlation coefficients for dependent and explanatory variables Operationalization of dependent and explanatory variables: property competition judicial independence ideology distributional conflict.