The process of economic globalization, as product and capital markets integrate, places huge, and it is argued by some, irresistible pressures on the worlds 'insider' stakeholder oriented corporate governance systems. Insider corporate governance systems in countries such as Germany and Japan, so the argument goes, should converge or be transformed by global product and capital market pressures to the 'superior' shareholder oriented 'outsider' corporate governance model prevalent in the UK and the US. What these pressures from globalization are, how they manifest themselves and whether they are likely to cause such a convergence/transformation lies at the heart of the exploration in this volume. This book explores the contested theoretical context in which corporate governance convergence scholarship has occurred and the influence of shareholder oriented theories in framing the rules upon which the process of globalizing capital markets has been based. This book uses institutional analysis to identify corporate law, the financial system, the industrial relations system, and subsystems related to the government demand function, particularly competition and effective demand, as institutional sub-systems that are central to corporate governance outcomes. It then illustrates the coherence of both insider and outsider systems as workable combinations of complementary institutional sub-systems at the national level. It shows that economic globalization through increased product market competition, the globalization of production and the globalization of capital markets places significant pressures on key aspects of insider systems that could affect their institutional coherence. The book utilizes institutional theories of change that predict diversity of response to stimulus within corporate governance systems was likely, rather than uniformity of reaction. In doing so the authors dismiss convergence arguments of a neo-classical origin that predict a spontaneous outsider