Incentives and political economy
- ISBN: 9780199248681
- Editorial: Oxford University Press
- Fecha de la edición: 2001
- Lugar de la edición: Oxford. Reino Unido
- Colección: Clarendon Lectures in Economics
- Encuadernación: Rústica
- Medidas: 21 cm
- Nº Pág.: 270
- Idiomas: Inglés
Incentives and Political Economy constructs a normative approach to constitutional design using recent developments in contract theory. It treats political economy as the study of the incentive problems created by the delegation of economic policy to self-interested politicians. Politicians are treated successively as informed supervisors or residual decision-makers. The optimal constitutional responses to the activities of interest groups are characterized in various circumstances, as well as the optimal trade-off between flexibility of decision-making and discretion to pursue personal agendas when the incompleteness of the constitutional contract is recognized
Chapter 1: Introduction Part I: Politicians as Informed Supervisors Chapter 2: The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design Chapter 3: An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers Chapter 4: Checks and Balances Part II: Flexibility versus Discretion in Constitutional Design Chapter 5: Political Economy and Industrial Policy Chapter 6: Political Economy and the Marginal Cost Pricing Controversy Chapter 7: Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation Part III: Coalition Formation and Constitutional Design Chapter 8: Optimal Constitutional Responses to Coalition Formation Chapter 9: Collusion and Decentralization Chapter 10: Concluding Remarks
