Logotipo librería Marcial Pons
A theory of legal obligation

A theory of legal obligation

  • ISBN: 9781108465878
  • Editorial: Cambridge University Press
  • Lugar de la edición: Cambridge. Reino Unido
  • Encuadernación: Rústica
  • Medidas: 23 cm
  • Nº Pág.: 368
  • Idiomas: Inglés

Papel: Rústica
54,60 €
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The focus of this monograph lies in the construction of a theory of legal obligation, understanding it as a discrete notion with its own defining traits. In this work, Bertea specifically addresses the question: how should legal obligation be distinctively conceptualized? The conceptualization of legal obligation he defends in this work gradually emerges from a critical assessment of the theories of legal obligation that have been most influential in the contemporary legal-theoretical debate. Building on such critical analysis, Bertea's study purports to offer a novel and unconventional conceptualization of legal obligation, which is characterized as a law-engendered intersubjective reason for carrying out certain courses of conduct.

Questions how should legal obligation be distinctively conceptualized and defends a comprehensive and original theory of legal obligation
Critically assesses the most influential theoretical existing models and presents a new, alternative concept of legal obligation
Explores a unique methodology of inquiry that has not been used in jurisprudence before and is not reducible to any of the traditional methods employed

1. The concept of obligation
2. Contemporary approaches to legal obligations: a preliminary map
3. The social-practice account
4. The interpretivist account
5. The conventionalist reason account
6. The exclusionary reason account
7. A revisionary Kantian conception
8. Further dimensions of the revisionary Kantian conception
9. The robust reason account
10. The method of presuppositional interpretation


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